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1 Introduction
Empirical research in behavioral economics has established that human decision making is
systematically less-than-fully rational and partly unconscious. More importantly, people’s
decisions deviate from the recommendations by ”standard” economics in somewhat pre-
dictable ways (Ariely, 2008), while some people are more prone to commit bias than others
(e.g. Stanovich and West (1998)). Lately, there has been development in identifying char-
acteristics that can be used to predicts one’s susceptibility to bias. Such measures include
the Need for Cognition (NFC) score by Petty et al. (1984) and the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT) by Frederick (2005). Both measures have been linked to a variety of biases in several
studies (see, e.g. Toplak et al. (2011), Weber and Johnson (2009), West et al. (2008)).
One would expect certain overlap and interaction between the measures of cognition,
but in studies relating a given cognitive disposition to performance in heuristics-and-biases
tasks, cognitive traits other than intelligence are rarely controlled for. By simultaneously
measuring several cognitive dispositions, I aim to enhance our understanding regarding
different cognitive dispositions and associated behavioral phenomena. Moreover, by utilizing
multiple regressions to analyze survey responses, I aim to find out whether all measures are
linked to a certain set of biases, or whether different measures are better at explaining
different behavioral phenomena.
Meanwhile, there is ”a rapidly growing interest in replication within psychology and
concern over failures to replicate published findings” (Cesario, 2014). While my primary
aim is to map the connections between certain cognitive dispositions and biased behavior,
the study also serves a secondary purpose of conducting a robustness check on previous
findings linking cognitive disposition to certain behavioral patterns.
If we were able to understand how biased behavior arises and which individual character-
istics are affiliated with biased behavior, we might be more able to i) make hiring decisions
that better serve our needs ii) shape our education systems to support better decision mak-
ing, iii) identify arbitrage opportunities that arise from biased decisions made by others,
and iv) in the spirit of the Delphic maxim Know thyself, observe and reduce bias in our own
decision making.
This study is built around an online survey that had over 800 participants. Each indi-
vidual was given a Cognitive Reflection Test score and a Need for Cognition score in order
aim to measure the extent to which they employ deeper levels of their thinking capacity.
In addition to NFC and CRT scores, I utilize the Wason selection task by Wason (1966)
and Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) score by Stanovich and West (2007) to further
distinguish between the cognitive tendencies of the participants. The participants also an-
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swered some well-known heuristics-and-biases tasks1, as well as several questions regarding
policy issues and religious beliefs.2.
As it turns out, higher scores in the selected measures of cognitive dispositions are asso-
ciated with lower rates of bias and loss aversion, higher rates of risk neutrality, more liberal
views on social policy issues, and lower rates of religiosity. Although some behavioral pat-
terns were associated with more than one measure of cognitive dispositions, CRT and NFC
predicted outcomes in heuristics-and-biases tasks independent of each other: performance
in some tasks was better predicted by CRT, vice versa.
This thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 examines research regarding i) heuristics
and biases relevant for this study, ii) dual-process thinking, iii) measures of cognitive dis-
positions, and iv) what is known about the link between bias and cognitive characteristics.
Section 3 explains the survey setting and empirical identification strategy employed in this
study. Section 4 describes the data, with section 5 providing the analysis and findings. Sec-
tion 6 summarizes the findings, discusses the key limitations inherent in the present study
and concludes.
2 Literature review
2.1 Biases and inconsistent behavior
The biases studied in this thesis work have been chosen, for they i) have been both proven
robust in repeated studies, and ii) have been linked to the cognitive dispositions of interest
here3.
In addition to the biases discussed here, my study involves other variables as well, such
as risk neutrality and certain opinions and beliefs. To be clear, these are not and should not
be considered biases or ”bad thinking”, but have been included in the study on the ground
that they might be related to cognitive characteristics of interest. These variables will not
be discussed as part of my literature review, but rather are briefly explained in section 5.
2.1.1 Anchoring effect
Anchoring effect was first established in a classical paper by Tversky and Kahneman (1974),
where participants differed in their estimates of the value of 8!, depending on whether they
were asked to estimate (1*2*3*4*5*6*7*8) or (8*7*6*5*4*3*2*1), with the latter group
yielding higher estimates. ”In many situations, people make estimates by starting from
1Including measures of Anchoring effect, Conjunction fallacy, Present bias, risk neutrality and loss aver-
sion
2Questions included issues such as abortion, gay rights, religiosity and climate change.
3Especially Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and Need for Cognition (NFC).
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an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. [...] adjustments are typically
insufficient. That is, different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased
toward the initial values. We call this phenomenon anchoring” (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974).
Anchoring effect, or the decision maker’s internalizing of an uninformative anchor into
her choices, has proved ”extremely robust” in research ever since 1974 (Furnham and Boo,
2011). It has been observed - apart from multiple laboratory settings - in real life situations,
such as investment decisions by institutional investors (Liao et al., 2013), bookmakers in
horse races (McAlvanah and Moul, 2013) and in legal sentencing (Mussweiler, 2001). In a
highly interesting finding for momentum-investors, stock market ”short-term underreaction
is best characterized as an anchoring bias” (George and Hwang, 2004), providing investors
sophisticated in behavioral finance arbitrage opportunities (Andersen, 2010).
In a recent working paper Hukkanen and Keloharju showed with real-world data that in
mergers and acquisitions, the outcomes are affected by not only the size of the initial cash
offer, but also by their precision (Hukkanen and Keloharju, 2015). The initial offer, which
is usually higher than the final price agreed upon - serves as an anchor. That anchor is
stronger for more precise offers, and so more precise initial offers are correlated with higher
outcome prices for successful M&A acquisitions.
Clearly, incorporating uninformative anchors into one’s decisions stands in stark contrast
to the assumed perfect processing of all available information of the Homo Economicus.
2.1.2 Conjunction fallacy
One of the most basic tenets of probability theory is that the joint probability P(AB) cannot
be higher than either P(A) or P(B) alone. As shown by Tversky and Kahneman, people are
easily tricked to believe otherwise (1983b).
The classic example is that of ”Linda”, who is described as single, outspoken, very bright,
philosophy major, who has taken interest in issues of discrimination. Participants are then
asked to estimate which of the following is more probable:
1. She works in a bank
2. She works in a bank and is active in the feminist movement
Clearly, the former (works in a bank) has higher probability than the latter, which con-
sists of a joint probability (works in a bank, active in the feminist movement). However, the
majority of participants chose the latter option. Even in a debiased condition, in which the
first option was formulated ”She works in a bank whether or not she is active in the femi-
nist movement”, 57 percent of respondents chose the false option (Tversky and Kahneman,
7
1983b).
The clear tendency to fall prey to conjunction fallacy can be used as an argument against
assuming people behave fully rationally like Homo Economicus, i.e. are able to correctly
estimate probabilities, and poses a challenge for perfect market hypothesis.
2.1.3 Present-bias
”Empirical studies [...] suggest that, ceteris paribus, humans and animals [...] act as though
they discount future payoffs [...] with discount rates that increase as the time before those
payoffs grows shorter. In other words, subjects act as though they become less patient,
when the payoffs are more imminent.” (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005)
Expected Utility Theory, one of the cornerstones of standard economics, assumes that
discount rates for a given period are not affected by how far in the future that period lies
- i.e. it assumes - or rather, depends on - time-consistent discounting, or constant utility
discount function.
”A vast literature in experimental psychology has studied time preferences by eliciting
preferences over various alternative rewards obtained at different times, that is, over re-
ward–time pairs.” (Benhabib et al., 2010) An important behavioral regularity observed is
“reversal of preferences”, which occurs, ”for example, when a subject prefers $10 now rather
than $12 in a day, but he/she prefers $12 in a year plus a day rather than $10 in a year.
Reversals of preferences are not consistent with exponential discounting.” (Benhabib et al.,
2010)
Hyperbolic discounting, or present bias, induces dynamically time-inconsistent prefer-
ences. It is a state where rewards not in the immediate future are discounted with a higher
interest rate (Rubinstein, 2003), leading to higher decision weights to immediate returns.
Moreover, hyperbolic discounting function has been observed to better fit participant pref-
erences than exponential discounting functions (Kirby and Marakovic´, 1995), which have
been offered as an alternative explanation to the anomaly.
Hyperbolic discounting is of interest for policymakers and social scientists, as it greatly
influences people’s decisions with long-term consequences, such as unhealthy consumption
(Cremer and Pestieau, 2011). Taking present-bias into account in retirement savings plan
design has been shown to increase personal saving rates (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). In a
very recent paper in the American Economic Review, researchers found that impoverished
households showed significantly more present-bias in their decision making right before
payday, than immediately after it Carvalho et al. (2016).
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Figure 1: Hypothetical value function, source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
2.1.4 Loss aversion
In their landmark paper of 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky laid down the founda-
tions of behavioral economics by introducing Prospect Theory: a theoretical model, backed
by observations and experiments, that explains how and why people’s decisions contrast the
expected utility theory (EUT).
”In Prospect theory, outcomes are expressed as positive or negative deviations (gains
or losses) from a neutral reference outcome”. Tversky and Kahneman propose ”that the
value function is commonly S-shaped, concave above the reference point and convex below
it”. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1985) In short, losses are felt as more intense than gains of
the same size4, while both domains (loss and gain) have a diminishing sensitivity to the
magnitude of the outcome5, giving us a (hypothetical) value function - pictured below -
very different from the homogeneously upwards sloping utility curve assumed in standard
economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
4E.g. the disutility of losing 10 euros feels more intense than the additional utility of gaining 10 euros.
It is estimated that losses of a given size are felt as twice as intense as gains of the same size. (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992)
5E.g. the difference between a gain of 100 euros and 105 euros feels lesser than the difference between a
gain of 15 euros and 10 euros.
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Standard economics assumes that decision maker’s utility is determined by final total
wealth, and not whether that total wealth is the result of an initial gain and a subsequent loss
or vice versa. However, Tversky and Kahneman showed that people’s behavior predictably
violates the assumption - in an survey setting, participants chose different health policies
in choice situations with equal probability distributions of final outcomes, depending on
whether the change was framed as a gain (saved lives) or as a loss (lost lives). (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1985)
Prospect theory implies a risk attitude that is inconsistent, and so fits the standard utility
function poorly, if at all. Namely, the implied risk preference is one where decision maker
avoids risk in the positive domain, while also being risk seeking in the negative domain. The
reason is quite simple: if the additional discomfort of a marginal increase in loss is smaller
for larger losses, gambling on losses generates utility. Similarly, gambling on gains would be
utility destroying, as a marginal increase in possible gains is not worth the risk.
2.2 Dual-processes in decision making
”In every one of us there are two ruling and directing principles, whose guidance we follow
wherever they may lead; the one being an innate desire of pleasure; the other, an acquired
judgment which aspires after excellence”
Since Plato’s account of Socrates in Phaedrus in 370 BC (above), and at least since
the 1872, when Friedrich Nietzsche wrote about Dionysian and Apollonian motives of the
mind, the concept of two conflicting modes of thinking in one brain has been familiar to
the educated public (Russell, 1945). 140 years and massive amounts of scientific research
later, psychologists nowadays believe that human thinking is characterized by (at least)
two distinct systems of thinking (Evans, 2003) - a book called Dual-Processes in Social
Psychology discusses 30 different (yet not mutually exclusive) dual-process models (Chaiken
and Trope, 1999), and more have emerged since (see, e.g. Stanovich (2009)).
As popularized by Nobel-laureate Daniel Kahneman in his best-selling book Thinking,
Fast and Slow (2011), System 1 is quick, effortless, unconscious and constantly active, while
deliberate and analytical thinking belong to the domain of System 2, which is believed by
some to be uniquely human (Evans, 2003). Intuition, being based on the System 1, works
well in certain situations, but is prone to bias in others (Kahneman, 2003). I found it very
illustrative when, designing and testing the survey for this study, a test participant - a very
bright economics student - commented on the beta-version that ”I can’t decide whether
to follow my intuition here, or to use the calculations in my head, because they are very
different things and I can’t foresee how I would really choose”.
Stanovich (2009, 2011) develops, on top of the more traditional dual-process model of
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the mind a tripartite structure, in which System 2 is further divided into algorithmic and
reflective minds. The former has individual differences in fluid intelligence, whereas reflective
mind has individual differences in rational thinking dispositions.
In an illustrative remark, Stanovich and West, after studying the link between SAT scores
and behavioral biases - using between-subjects design - concluded that ”people of higher
cognitive ability [here: SAT scores] are no more likely to recognize the need for a normative
principle than are individuals of lower cognitive ability. When the former6 believe that
nothing normative is at stake, they behave remarkably like other people. If told, however,
that they are in a situation of normative conflict and if resolving the conflict requires holding
a prepotent response in abeyance, then the individual of high cognitive ability will show less
of many different cognitive biases.” (Stanovich and West, 2008)
2.3 Measures of cognitive dispositions
I use two distinct measures of cognitive disposition, namely the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT) and the Need for Cognition Scale (NFC) score. Both measures are estimated based
on individual’s survey answers. Even though a strong link exists, neither measure directly
corresponds to intelligence, but rather aims at processes of the reflective mind, advanced by
Stanovich (2008, 2009, 2011).
The two measures are linked to, yet distinct from each other and other domains of
intelligence. In the original paper introducing CRT, the observed correlation between CRT
and NFC was 0.22, the correlation between CRT and SAT scores 0.44, while the correlation
between NFC and SAT scores was 0.3 (Frederick, 2005). Later, CRT has been observed to
correlate strongly with other measures of general intellect (Bergman et al., 2010).
2.3.1 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
CRT is a simple, three-item questionnaire, that suggests impulsive wrong answers to par-
ticipants, whose ability to overcome the impulsive answer by means of analytical thought is
measured on a scale of zero to three (Frederick, 2005).
The three questions included in a CRT are:
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines
to make 100 widgets?
6People of higher cognitive abilities
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3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to
cover half of the lake?
The usual incorrect answers to the questions are (in order listed above) 10 cents, 100
minutes and 24 days7.
CRT has been linked to several cognitive biases. In the original study by Frederik,
individuals with a high CRT score were found to be more patient, less risk averse in positive
domain, and less risk seeking in the negative domain (Frederick, 2005). CRT has even been
called the ”most consistent predictor across choice measures” (Weber and Johnson, 2009). It
has been found to predict performance in heuristics-and-biases tasks better than intelligence
tests, possibly because ”neither intelligence tests nor measures of executive functioning assess
the tendency toward miserly8 processing in the way that the CRT does” Toplak et al. (2011)
High CRT scores have been linked with lower base rate fallacy, higher accuracy in self-
assessment, and less (irrational) conservatism in Bayesian probability re-evaluation (Hoppe
and Kusterer, 2011). Higher CRT has also been linked with lower rates on conjunction
fallacy (Oechssler et al., 2009), although the finding has not replicated consistently (Albaity
et al., 2014).
In the ”Newsvendor problem” - a classic on the field of operations management - where
participants have to decide how much stock to buy for each day, participants with high CRT
have been observed to make more optimal choices, with CRT being a better predictor for
success than college major, years of experience or managerial position Moritz et al. (2013).
An expanded 7-item version of the original CRT has been observed to reliably predict
i) general openness of thinking, ii) being more considerate of future consequences, iii) lower
belief bias in evaluating validity of premise-conclusion pairs and iv) lower tendency of de-
nominator neglect Toplak et al. (2014). Individuals with higher CRT have been observed
to be generally less religious Pennycook et al. (2014).
CRT has been set under scrutiny on the basis of being - allegedly - only another form
of mathematical ability, as mathematical ability seems to explain away some covariance
between CRT and biased decision making (Welsh et al., 2013).
2.3.2 Need for Cognition (NFC)
Attempting to measure one’s extent of thinking across a variety of domains is difficult and
time-consuming, but estimating that based on subjective evaluations is quick and effortless.
7The correct answers are, naturally, 5 cents, 5 minutes and 47 days
8Here, ”miserly processing” describes thinking for which one doesn’t utilize her full cognitive capacity.
Personally, I would call it ”lazy thinking”.
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Need for Cognition refers to ”individual’s chronic tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful
cognitive activities” and has been linked to general intelligence (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982).
With regard to the dual-process theories of decision-making, NFC has been ”used as
a way to determine the mechanism by which individual’s judgments would be formed or
changed.” (Petty et al., 2009)
Like most other research taking advantage of NFC, this thesis work follows the shortened
version of 18 question, as introduced by the original authors two years after the original
(Petty et al., 1984). In each of the questions, the participants are asked to evaluate how
characteristic a statement is of themselves, each evaluation being graded on a scale of [-4,
4], resulting in final scores between -72 and 72. Some items on the survey are ”I prefer
complex to simple tasks” and ”Thinking is not my idea of fun”, the latter being reverse
scored. Minor modifications regarding vocabulary were used in a few questions to enable
participation by individuals with less-than-stellar English; e.g. the word ”deliberating” was
changed to ”thinking deeply”.
The Need for Cognition Scale has been linked to a higher tendency to ”think about
a variety of things”, including one’s own thoughts, giving some protection from common
judgmental biases (Petty et al., 2009).
It has been shown that the mere perception of message complexity varies the probability
of processing by individuals of varying NFC, with messages labeled complex being processed
mainly by individuals with higher NFC scores (See et al., 2009).
Higher NFC has been linked with higher number of thoughts and more metacognition
(thoughts about the thoughts one has) (Petty et al., 2007), smaller anchoring effect (Epley
and Gilovich, 2006) and tendency to consider all available information (Levin et al., 2000).
In general, individuals with lower NFC tend to be more susceptible for bias that results
from thinking too little (such as the Halo-effect9), whereas individuals with high NFC are
more susceptible to bias that results from overthinking (such as priming effects and creating
false memories) (Petty et al., 2009).
2.3.3 Wason and AOT - other cognitive dispositions
While the present study focuses on CRT and NFC as main indicators of the cognitive
processes that are of interest for our current purposes, two other crude, but possibly effective
measures have emerged: the Wason selection task and the Actively Open-minded Thinking
scale.
In the Wason selection task, a classical logic puzzle, the participants are shown four
9Halo effect, or attribute substitution, is a bias due to which ”evidence of one favorable trait induces
favorable judgments on a wide range of other dimensions Morewedge and Kahneman (2010)
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cards, each with a letter on one side, and a number on the other side. They are then given
a statement and asked which cards they would have to turn over to validate or disqualify
the statement (Wason, 1966).
The four cards are G, 7, 2, U. The participants are then asked to evaluate which card(s)
they would have to turn around to evaluate whether the following statement is true: ”all
cards with a vowel on one side have an even number on the other side”. The right answer
is to turn around the two cards that can prove the statement wrong, namely 7 and U, and
to not turn around the other two cards. The most common mistake is to unnecessarily
turn the number three, while neglecting the card with the number seven, i.e. failing to spot
”implicit negation” (Evans, 2016).
The extent to which one takes evidence into account in forming conclusions regarding
the world we live in is fundamental for not only the efficient market hypothesis, but also
for the extent that science and facts are valued in society and the political process. This
attitude towards principles, evidence and changing one’s mind is estimated using so-called
AOT10 scale (see, e.g., (Stanovich and West, 2007)), which has been found to predict ”the
tendency to collect information [...]. To the extent that available information is predictive of
future outcomes, actively open-minded thinkers are more likely than others to make accurate
forecasts.” (Haran et al., 2013)
2.3.4 Other individual characteristics, bias and life outcomes
To be sure, CRT and NFC are only part of the myriad of cognitive aspects likely to affect
individual decision making and life outcomes. In this chapter I will - very briefly - make a
few notions about endogeneity and other important aspects.
It could be hypothesized that tendency for biased decision-making affects one’s probabil-
ity for success in other domains in life, including being financially well-off. Also, it might be
argued that being financially well-off affects one’s behavior regarding financial incentives;
as mentioned earlier, people’s present-bias has been found to be far greater right before
payday, than immediately after one (Carvalho et al., 2016). A recent experimental study
mapping differences in risk and time preferences in Vietnam found out that ”in villages with
higher mean income, people are less loss-averse and more patient” (Tanaka et al., 2016). As
discussed earlier, high CRT has been linked with increased risk neutrality. Whether this is
due to differentiated cognitive processes, or due to higher CRT leading to financial success
and thus risk neutrality regarding moderate amounts of money, remains unknown.
It is not known whether high CRT scores and positive outcomes in life correlate be-
cause of the cognitive reflection, or the numeric ability demonstrated in the CRT. High
10Actively Open-minded Thinking
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intelligence scores, especially those measuring mathematical ability, has been observed to
correlate negatively with financial mistakes later in life (Agarwal and Mazumder, 2010).
In a study by Burks et al. (2009), individuals with higher cognitive skill (measured as
non-verbal IQ, planning ability or ”Hit 15” and quantitative literacy or ”numeracy”) were
observed to differ from individuals with low cognitive skills in terms of economic preferences:
they were more patient both in short term and long term, better at forecasting behavior
of others in prisoner’s dilemma games, and more persevering on the job with penalties for
early exit.
It has been argued that expertise might reduce biased behavior. This argument seems
to hold, as shown by John List in an experimental setting as regards sports cards dealers
and endowment effect (2004). In a survey setting, expertise in finance has been linked to
diminishing anchoring effect in finance-related estimates (Kaustia et al., 2008). There seems
to exist a possibility of debiasing through experience, but the plausibility and extent of that
option are not known - partly due to lack of controls in the studies above. It might well be,
that those professionals with higher tendency to show certain biases simply are forced out
of the market, or that other, similarly non-random, selection processes apply.
Bergman et al. (2010) found a significant link between anchor strength and general
intelligence, but no link between anchor strength and CRT. As mentioned in section 2.3.2,
anchor strength has been shown to correlate negatively with NFC.
To complicate the matter further, two other important factors are worth mentioning,
but far outside the scope of this study. Bastian et al. (2005) and others have shown that
emotional intelligence, or detecting and using emotional information - can be used to predict
life outcomes. How emotional intelligence is connected to general intelligence or heuristics-
and-biases tasks, remains unknown.
Individuals with more willpower - also called ”the greatest human strength” - tend to
succeed in various domains in life, as popularized by Baumeister and Tierney (2011). ”To
recapitulate, the skills and motivations that enable the phenomenon of ‘willpower’, and
particularly the ability to inhibit prepotent ‘hot’ responses and impulses in the service
of future consequences, appear to be important early-life markers for long-term adaptive
mental and physical development.” (Mischel et al., 2011)
Clearly, mapping the effects and cross-dependencies of different cognitive measures and
dispositions has only begun.
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3 Survey setting
The survey was conducted online and distributed on social media and university mailing lists
in February 2016. No prizes or payments were promised for participating, but rather I relied
on voluntary participants’ intrinsic motivation to provide accurate and truthful replies. The
survey was estimated to take 15 to 20 minutes to complete.
To tackle problems related to priming or boredom-effect, the within-section question
order was randomized between individuals, except for anchoring effect measurement, which
explicitly requires a certain order. The section order was i) background information, ii)
anchoring effect iii) all other questions and lastly iv) feedback to the survey.The participants
were given only a general description of the survey, and were neither informed of the survey’s
design, the research objectives, the measuring of cognitive abilities nor warned against any
potential biases.
The empirical strategy starts from the hypothesis that cognitive dispositions have a
causal effect on the extent of bias in one’s choices, and so CRT and NFC scores are correlated
with survey answers in heuristics-and-biases tasks. The correlation coefficients between
various cognitive dispositions and behavioral traits are estimated using multiple regressions,
while controlling for various background variables. These control variables include age,
gender and level of education, but also the level of education received by each parent as a
proxy for socioeconomic status.
4 Data
In total, 818 participants answered11 the survey, out of which 34 replies were disregarded
as invalid, leaving 784 replies to be analyzed. The invalid responses were either incomplete,
or the participants admitted to using external help, such as talking the questions through
with a friend or seeking advice online. Additionally, 33 participants did not specify the
level of education received by either one of the parents, leaving regressions utilizing parental
education with 751 observations. Individual participants could not be identified from the
data.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The average age of the participants was 27.2, with 72 percent of respondents being 20 to
29 years old. The standard deviation of age was 7.58 years. The oldest participant was 82
11As the survey was distributed on social media and emailing lists, it is impossible to know the number of
people who saw the invitation to participate, but chose not to. This is obviously a source of selection bias,
the extent of which remains unknown.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St. dev Min Max Median
CRT 1.97 1.08 0 3 2
NFC 22.56 18.88 -40 72 23
Age 27.21 7.59 18 82 25
Gender 0.37 0.48
Education 2.96 0.83 1 5 3
Mother’s education 2.96 1.11 1 5 3
Father’s education 2.99 1.25 1 5 3
Mathematics 3.12 1.61 1 6 3
Note: Gender is a dummy variable where one stands for male and zero for female.
Educational variables are all on a scale of (1, 5), with one being ”only primary edu-
cation” and five being ”Doctoral degree or equivalent. Mathematics is a variable on a
scale of (1, 6), where one stands for ”my field of studies is not mathematical at all (e.g.
humanities)” and six for ”my field of studies is highly mathematical (mathematics,
statistics etc.)
years old, while the youngest individual was 18 years old.
Almost two thirds of participants (496 individuals, or 63.3 percent) were female, while
288 were were male. The mean ages for female and male were 27.2 and 27.3, respectively.
93 percent, or 732 participants, were Finnish nationals12.
The sample has a high degree of education13: 67 percent of participants had a Bachelor’s
degree or higher, while one in four participants reported having Master’s degree. 21 par-
ticipants had already received their PhD’s, while only four individuals out of 784 had not
(yet) graduated from high school or equivalent. The majority of those without a university
degree are expected to be students - the median age of participants without a degree was 22
years, while 90 percent of cohort were 27 years old or younger. The parents’ educations were
strongly correlated with each other: the correlation coefficient between mother’s education
and father’s education was 0.49, yet there was almost no correlation between one’s level of
education and that of their parents’.
The level of education was fairly similar between male and female participants, but the
fields of studies differed dramatically. Male participants were more likely to have studied
at least some economics or finance: 57 percent, compared to 33 percent for female partic-
12Of the 52 non-Finnish participants, 37 were from EU/ETA countries. Nationality was not found to be
a significant predictor in any of the questions of interest.
13For the sake of numerical estimation, the levels of education received by the participant and each of her
parents were rated on a scale of (1, 5), with one being primary education, two being secondary education,
three standing for Bachelor’s degree, four for a Master’s and five for a PhD.
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Table 2: Level of education
(1) (2) (3)
education education education
CRT 0.00247 -0.00165 -0.000108
(0.0254) (0.0261) (0.0258)
NFC 0.00387∗∗ 0.00368∗ 0.00416∗∗
(0.00136) (0.00143) (0.00146)
age 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗
(0.00513) (0.00522) (0.00527)
male -0.0541 -0.0440
(0.0556) (0.0558)
pseudo-AOT -0.0169
(0.0105)
religiosity -0.00427
(0.0126)
parents’ education YES YES
Constant 1.322∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ 1.383∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.172) (0.179)
Observations 784 751 750
R2 0.287 0.286 0.288
F 35.04 23.87 17.88
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions: participants’ level of education re-
gressed on cognitive measure (CRT, NFC, pseudo-AOT), their age and gender, the
education level of their parents’, and their reported religiosity.
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Table 3: Correlation of background variables
Age CRT NFC Gender Math Education
Age 1.0000
CRT -0.1762 1.0000
NFC 0.0396 0.2304 1.0000
Gender 0.0024 0.2885 0.2344 1.0000
Math -0.0935 0.3070 0.2140 0.3679 1.0000
Education 0.5278 -0.0835 0.0967 -0.0093 -0.0457 1.0000
Parental education -0.2147 0.1096 0.0914 0.0781 0.1429 -0.0907
The table reports correlations between several variables used in the study. Parental
education is the sum of each parents’ level of education, both of which are measured
on a scale of one to five. N=751
ipants14. Male participants also reported having significantly more mathematical fields of
studies: on a scale of one to six, male participants estimated the level of mathematics in
their studies to be a 3.89, while females averaged 2.67.
Results from the OLS regressions15 mapping the relations between education, CRT, NFC
and background variables can be seen in table 2. Interestingly, within the sample, parents’
education does not reliably predict the education level of their children - although this is
probably due to selection bias rather than evidence of absence. Of all the variables, only
NFC score16 is related to to education level with an acceptable confidence level. The point
estimate of the coefficient is, however, only 0.00387, meaning that for every additional point
of NFC, the participant is estimated to have 0.004 points higher education (on a scale of
one to five). Frankly, it is so insubstantial that differences in NFC can hardly be used to
estimate one’s educational level, even if a statistically significant correlation exists17.
14The high share of economics and finance students is explained by the fact that all students at Aalto
University School of Business - where many participants currently study - are required to study the principles
of economics and finance during their first year of college. For regression purposes, the extent of economics
or finance one had studied was rated on a scale of (0, 2), with zero being ”no studies”, one being ”some
studies” and two standing for ”extensive studies”
15All the regressions used in this study utilize heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
16Additionally, age has a positive coefficient, most probably because older people have had more time to
finish their education.
17See table 4 for estimating NFC based on education.
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4.2 Cognitive Reflection Test
On average, the participants solved correctly almost two out of the three questions in the
CRT (average 1.97 points).18 Specifically, 15 percent of the participants answered none of
the three questions correctly, scoring zero points, similarly 15 percent of the participants
scored one point, 28 percent scored two points and 42 percent scored the full three points.
The average score for females was 1.73, while the average for males was 2.38.
CRT score was correlated with age, although the correlation was driven by over 30-
year-olds. The group that scored the full three points in CRT had an average age of 26.0,
with average age increasing for lower scoring groups: 27.1 for those who scored two points,
28.5 for those who scored one point and 29.5 for the group that scored zero points. Age
was negatively correlated with CRT score even when controlling for factors such as level of
education and gender (P<0.001). While fluid intelligence has been shown to decrease with
age (Horn and Cattell, 1967), this also raises the question whether some age-related selection
process applies to sample19. No significant link between CRT and age was observable for
adults under 30 years old (see section 7.2 for additional analysis).
The level of education was not a significant predictor of one’s CRT score and neither
was the education received by either one of the parents. Given the numerical nature of
CRT, it should come as no surprise that the level of mathematics in one’s field of study was
positively correlated with one’s CRT score - variance in the former explains approximately
9.7 % of the variance in the latter.
For ease of interpretation, key point estimates for both CRT and NFC are as follows.
For every additional point of NFC score, the participant is expected to have 0.0088 points
higher CRT score, and similarly, each additional point of CRT is associated with a 2.83
-point increase in one’s NFC score. Other things constant, males tended to have 0.42 points
higher CRT scores and 5.16 points higher NFC scores. More mathematical fields of studies
were correlated with higher CRT scores so that each additional level20 of mathematics was
associated with a 0.13 point increase in one’s CRT and 1.07 point increase in NFC. For each
additional level of education received, the participants tended to have 2.14 points higher
NFC scores.
18Interestingly enough, this places the survey respondents between students in Princeton University (aver-
age 1.63 points) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (average 2.18 points). (Frederick, 2005). Clearly,
some non-random selection process is at work here.
19E.g. working age population that finds and participates in questionnaires on social media might be
different from the working age population that doesn’t.
20Self-reported, on a scale of 1-6
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Table 4: CRT, NFC and background variables
(1) (2)
CRT NFC
NFC 0.00879∗∗∗
(0.00206)
CRT 2.832∗∗∗
(0.654)
age -0.0224∗∗∗ 0.113
(0.00539) (0.0990)
male 0.419∗∗∗ 5.161∗∗∗
(0.0810) (1.428)
education 0.00240 2.138∗
(0.0526) (0.912)
mother’s education 0.0246 1.440∗
(0.0385) (0.703)
father’s education 0.000502 -0.172
(0.0318) (0.600)
math in studies 0.132∗∗∗ 1.074∗
(0.0261) (0.470)
econ studies -0.0365 1.613
(0.0516) (0.935)
Constant 1.753∗∗∗ -2.103
(0.212) (3.797)
Observations 751 751
R2 0.177 0.118
F 25.04 13.26
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions: participants’ CRT (1) and NFC (2)
scores regressed on each other, the individual’s age and gender, level of education, the
education level of each parent, the extent of mathematics in one’s field of study and
the extent of studies in economics and finance studies.
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4.3 Need for Cognition
The average NFC score was 22.56, with a standard deviation of 18.9 points. The highest
(lowest) NFC score observed was 72 (negative 40) points and the interquartile range was
from 11 to 36 points. Female participants scored, on average, 19.13 points, while the average
NFC score for male participants was 28.46. The correlation between CRT and NFC mea-
sured 0.226. In regressions with various controls, Need for Cognition score was correlated
positively with both the participant’s and her mother’s level of education21, but perhaps
more surprisingly, no link was found between NFC and age.
The OLS regression results table on the next page shows inter-dependencies between the
two measures of cognitive dispositions and the background variables22.
4.4 Statement validation
Out of 784 participants, 92 (11.73 %) answered the Wason selection task correctly. In
table 5 below I provide the results of logistic regressions showing the relations between
cognitive dispositions, background characteristics and the probability of correctly solving
the Wason selection task. In both regressions, CRT score and gender were highly significant
in predicting success in the Wason selection task, with male participants and those with a
higher CRT score having a higher probability of correctly solving the Wason selection task.
As I will discuss later in the study, success in statement validation task was found to be
associated with less biased behavior.
4.5 Pseudo-AOT
In an approximation of the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale, two questions were asked
to determine the participants’ attitude towards evidence and changing one’s mind.
• ”People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs.
Do you agree?”
• ”Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be
made against them.” Do you agree?
21Due to multicollinearity between father’s education and that of mothers, the coefficients between
parental education and NFC should be taken with a grain of salt - especially the negative (but insignificant)
coefficient between NFC and father’s education begs no other questions than those of technical nature as
regards econometrical modeling. The same goes for all regressions with both parents’ educations.
22”male” is a dummy variable, with a value of zero for females and one for males. The OLS regressions
utilize heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
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Table 5: Wason selection task
(1) (2)
Wason task Wason task
CRT 0.593∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.156)
NFC 0.0138 0.0129
(0.00748) (0.00780)
age -0.0193 -0.00196
(0.0221) (0.0234)
male 0.771∗∗ 0.748∗∗
(0.239) (0.248)
math in studies -0.0974 -0.112
(0.0731) (0.0783)
econ studies 0.0616
(0.162)
education -0.164
(0.184)
pseudo-AOT 0.0387
(0.0420)
parents’ education YES
Constant -3.227∗∗∗ -3.936∗∗∗
(0.818) (0.921)
Observations 784 751
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent dummy variable indicates whether the
participant correctly solved the Wason selection task (1=correct answer, 0=incorrect
answer). The table provides results of a logit regression with success in Wason se-
lection task regressed on CRT, NFC and pseudo-AOT scores, age and gender, extent
of mathematics and economics in one’s studies and the level of education received by
both the participant and her parents.
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The two items were taken from the Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) scale (see, e.g.
Stanovich and West (2007)). The answers23 were graded on a scale of (-4, 4), producing
a total score on a scale of (-8, 8) with a higher number representing higher openness to
evidence and lower dogmatism. The sample average was 4.28, the standard deviation 2.76
and the mode was six.
Even with this stub measurement (the original scale uses 41 items), ”pseudo-AOT”
correlated positively with CRT, NFC, and negatively with one’s reported religiosity. These
correlations were also significant in OLS regressions24, controlling for background variables.
Table 6 below shows the results. Interestingly, this ”pseudo-AOT” was a reliable predictor
of various opinions on controversial topics, for which I will provide evidence in subsection
5.5.
Point estimates of significant coefficients were as follows: each additional point of CRT
score was associated with a pseudo-AOT score higher by 0.25-0.28 points before controlling
for religiosity, and 0.20 after controlling for religiosity25. An increase in one’s NFC was
associated with an increase of 0.028-0.32 points on the pseudo-AOT scale. Males tended
to have pseudo-AOT scores 0.72-0.81 points higher, other things being equal. Each point
on the self-reported religiosity scale of (1, 9) was associated with a pseudo-AOT score 0.40
points lower, ceteris paribus.
4.6 Representativeness
While my sample is definitely not representative of the population as a whole26, I consider it
fairly well representative of the well-educated, younger sub-population - for the very least,
I consider my selection bias less pronounced than is the case in many empirical studies
conducted solely on, say, freshmen of a single university or even a single study program that
have specifically applied to participate in research at a given faculty.
5 Results
5.1 Anchoring effect
The anchoring method developed for the study was the following: participants were first
asked on which day of the month they were born on, which is assumed to be a random
23The answers were on a scale of (1, 9), that is from ”I disagree very strongly” to ”I agree very strongly”.
24Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
25Column (3)
26Given the young age, high education and astonishing CRT score.
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Table 6: Pseudo-AOT
(1) (2) (3)
pseudo-AOT pseudo-AOT pseudo-AOT
CRT 0.280∗∗ 0.247∗ 0.201∗
(0.0996) (0.102) (0.0972)
NFC 0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗
(0.00550) (0.00577) (0.00554)
age 0.00204 0.0151 0.0198
(0.0122) (0.0149) (0.0151)
male 0.722∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗
(0.225) (0.237) (0.226)
math in studies -0.0386 -0.0225 -0.0588
(0.0684) (0.0719) (0.0707)
econ studies -0.318∗ -0.261
(0.148) (0.144)
education -0.193 -0.184
(0.138) (0.133)
Wason task 0.199 0.175
(0.280) (0.264)
religiosity -0.395∗∗∗
(0.0496)
parents’ education YES YES
Constant 2.864∗∗∗ 3.022∗∗∗ 4.102∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.612) (0.605)
Observations 784 751 750
R2 0.094 0.103 0.186
F 15.54 8.078 15.08
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. The table provides results of an OLS regression with
pseudo-AOT score regressed on CRT and NFC score, success in Wason selection task,
age and gender, extent of mathematics and economics in one’s studies, the level of ed-
ucation received by both the participant and her parents and one’s reported religiosity.
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variable between 1 and 3127. That anchor was used for two purposes, for i) willingness to
pay and ii) estimating economic growth in China. 28
Table 7: Anchoring effect
(1) (2) (3)
estimated GDP growth estimated GDP growth estimated GDP growth
day of birth 0.0871∗∗∗ 0.0819∗∗∗ 0.0972
(0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0723)
NFC -0.00640 -0.00255
(0.00927) (0.0176)
CRT -0.267 -0.193
(0.222) (0.372)
Control variables YES YES
CRT*birthday -0.00496
(0.0290)
NFC*birthday -0.000241
(0.00110)
Constant 5.150∗∗∗ 9.385∗∗∗ 9.153∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.949) (1.255)
Observations 784 784 784
R2 0.019 0.052 0.052
F 12.93 5.957 4.909
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression: Estimates of GDP growth - in percent-
age points - regressed on the individual’s day of birth, i.e. the anchor, one’s CRT and
NFC scores and interaction terms between the anchor and one’s CRT and NFC scores.
Control variables include age, gender, education and extent of studies in economics or
finance.
In part i) the participants were then asked to evaluate whether they would be willing to
27not taking into account the fact that February has only 28 or 29 days and some months only have 30
days.
28Using birthday as an anchor is - to my knowledge - unique to the present study. The chosen method has
a clear advantage: an anchor dependent on one’s day of birth requires neither physical presence (such a s a
wheel of fortune), nor sophisticated survey programs (such as an algorithm to generate random numbers).
Similar anchoring structure (with U.S. social security numbers) was utilized by Ariely et al. (2006).
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spend an amount that equals their day of birth (in euros) on a ticket to the world premiere of
an assumed sequel to their favorite movie. After answering yes or no, the participants were
asked to indicate their maximum willingness to pay for the said ticket. The null hypothesis
was, in addition to observing anchoring effect, i.e. correlation between the day of birth
(within the given month), to observe a stronger anchoring effect for individuals with lower
CRT and/or NFC scores.
In part ii) of the anchoring questions, the anchoring mechanism was identical to that in
part i). The participants were asked first whether, in their estimate, the GDP of China will
grow more or less than x% percent in 2016, x being the day of month they were born on.
In the follow-up question participants were asked to evaluate the said growth rate.
The economic rationale here is that the day of month one is born contains absolutely no
information about either the utility the individual receives from watching a particular movie,
or about the economic growth in China. Incorporating the number into one’s estimates of
either value stands in contradiction with the idea of perfectly rational decision making.
Indeed, any predictive power of the random variable over either one’s willingness to pay or
stated growth estimate is a strong indicator of less-than-fully rational behavior.
Empirical analysis showed anchoring effect, i.e. correlation between one’s birthday
(within the birth month) and estimated growth of the Chinese economy, but the strength of
the anchor did not predictably vary between low and high scoring individuals. No anchoring
effect was evident in part i.
The regression results can be found in the table 7 ”Anchoring effect”.29 Anchoring effect
is evident in regressions (1) and (2), as day of birth is highly significant predictor for the
growth estimate: when one’s birthday was one day larger30, the participant is predicted to
give 0.087 percent points higher estimate of GDP growth in China.
However, in regression (3), the interaction terms31 had no predictive power over one’s es-
timate of GDP growth in China. Moreover, regression model (3) has no additional predictive
power32 over the dependent variable, and so the null hypothesis of predictable differences
in anchor strength for participants of different cognitive dispositions cannot be rejected.
29Day of birth stands for the day of month one was born on, CRT*birthday and NFC*birthday are
interaction terms between day of birth, NFC and CRT.
30Within the given month, as in ”27” for 27th September 1989, or ”28” for the 28th.
31The interaction terms between CRT or NFC and birthday (the anchor) measure whether differences in
test score are correlated with differences in the coefficient of day of birth, i.e. the strength of the anchor.
32The larger model (regression (3)) has the same R2, but lower F-score than model (2). Additionally, a
Wald-test for the two interactions terms turned out to have an insignificant F-score.
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5.2 Conjunction fallacy
Two questions were used to test conjunction fallacy, the first one being the classical Linda
problem used by Tversky and Kahneman (1983a) already described in section 2.1.2. In the
second question participants were asked to evaluate which one of the following scenarios has
a higher probability to happen in 2016:
1. The Russian economy will recover, causing the stock prices of Finnish exporting com-
panies to rise
2. The Russian economy will recover, whether or not it affects stock prices in Finland
The second question contains the same P(AB) < P(A) structure as the Linda problem,
with an attempt to debias the participant with the subordinate clause, similar to that used
by Tversky and Kahneman (1983a). Ability to correctly assess likelihoods of events is a
cornerstone of the expected utility theory, and failing to do so is a fallacy of the most basic
kind.
Conjunction fallacy was apparent in both questions, with 52.4 percent of participants
failing to correctly answer Linda problem and 30.2 percent failing the question regarding
Russia and Finnish stock prices33.
Table 8 ”Conjunction fallacy” shows the results from logistic regressions34. CRT score
was highly significant in predicting conjunction fallacy in the Linda problem with a nega-
tive coefficient. CRT was, however, not significant in predicting conjunction fallacy in the
Russia problem. In regression two, both Wason selection task and pseudo-AOT scores were
significant at the laxer 10 % confidence level, with negative coefficients. The interpretation
is clear: participants that had higher CRT or pseudo-AOT scores or had solved the Wason
selection task were, other things being equal, less likely to commit conjunction fallacy.
Conjunction fallacy in one problem was highly significant in predicting conjunction fal-
lacy in the other problem - interestingly, almost no other variable has a significant coefficient
to predict bias in both problems. Males have a lower probability to show bias in the Linda
problem, yet seem to have a higher probability of falling prey to conjunction fallacy in the
Russia problem35. Whether the apparent anomaly is related to the intricacies of conjunction
fallacy, to the topic of stock movements, or are the effect of randomness in data, remains
unknown. However, one might hypothesize that some background characteristics - be it
gender or field of study - make participants view the ”story” of stock market effects as
3319.3 percent failed both questions, a significant overlap.
34The regressions utilize heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy vari-
able that has the value of one if the participant answered wrong in the given problem. The independent
variable ”conjunction fallacy” (dummy) shows whether the participant answered the other problem correctly.
35This phenomena was not observed for under 30 year olds, see appendix for further discussion.
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Table 8: Conjunction fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fallacy, Linda fallacy, Linda fallacy, Linda fallacy, Russia
CRT -0.340∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ 0.0448
(0.0755) (0.0767) (0.0797) (0.0814)
NFC -0.00416 -0.00212 -0.00350 0.00254
(0.00424) (0.00437) (0.00452) (0.00455)
age -0.00502 -0.00686 -0.00313 -0.00664
(0.0105) (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0104)
male -0.439∗∗ -0.354∗ -0.414∗ 0.449∗
(0.168) (0.176) (0.184) (0.192)
math in studies -0.109∗ -0.108∗ -0.0915 -0.00570
(0.0510) (0.0529) (0.0550) (0.0585)
econ studies -0.0615 -0.0883 0.179
(0.112) (0.117) (0.115)
education 0.0262 0.00575
(0.109) (0.109)
Wason task -0.441 -0.364 -0.542
(0.237) (0.246) (0.280)
pseudo-AOT -0.0497 -0.0423 -0.0207
(0.0283) (0.0290) (0.0304)
parents’ education YES
conjunction fallacy 0.733∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.175)
Constant 1.510∗∗∗ 1.639∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗ -1.340∗∗
(0.368) (0.406) (0.508) (0.416)
Observations 784 784 751 784
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. Logit regression: conjunction fallacy (dummy) in
Linda problem (regressions 1-3) and in Russia problem (regression 4) regressed on
one’s CRT and NFC scores, age, gender, extent of mathematics in one’s field of studies,
the extent of studies in economics and finance, level of education, solving the Wason
selection task, pseudo-AOT score, education level of both parents’, and conjunction
fallacy in the other problem (Russia problem in (3), Linda problem in (4)).
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more plausible, rendering them more prone to bias regarding the specific topic. The level of
mathematics in one’s field of studies was significant at five percent level in regressions one
and two, and at ten percent level in regression three.
5.3 Impatience and present-bias
In the questionnaire present bias was measured using a pair of questions in which they were
asked, essentially, to indicate how much money they were willing to forgo in order to receive
a payment 12 months earlier. If the implied discount rate differs significantly between the
two cases, and one assumes no predictable changes in liquidity between participating in the
survey and six months later, one plausible explanation would be present bias.
Impatience is measured as the difference between 100 and their answer to the second
question36 (see below): a large difference implies a higher discount rate, i.e. that the
participant is willing to forgo a higher sum in order to receive the money one year earlier37.
• Suppose that you will receive 100 euros in one year for certain. If you accepted a
smaller amount, you could receive the money today instead. What is the smallest
amount to have today that you would prefer over the 100 euros in one year?
• Suppose that you will receive 100 euros in 18 months for certain. If you accepted a
smaller amount, you could receive the money in six months instead of 18. What is
the smallest amount to have in half-a-year that you would prefer over the 1000 euros
in one-and-a-half years?
The regression results can be seen in table 9 below38. NFC has a significant (P<0.05),
negative coefficient in explaining impatience with a limited set of variables. However, in
regression number two in the table, NFC is insignificant (P=0.103), whereas a correlated
variable I call ”pseudo-AOT” and discuss in chapter 6 is significant at 10 percent confidence
level.
Time-inconsistency of implied discount rate is estimated as the difference in answers to
questions one and two, i.e. the answer to the second question less the answer to the first. A
positive number indicates that the discount rate is higher for the more immediate reward, i.e.
time-inconsistent preferences. The median difference observed was zero. In the regressions,
only two variables have significant coefficients as regards time-inconsistency39. These are
36It is assumed to reflect impatience with higher accuracy than the first question, which might be troubled
by hyperbolia.
37For example, an impatience of 10 means, that the participant would rather have 90 euros in six months,
than 100 euros in 18 months, i.e. they would be willing to forgo 10 euros to receive the money one year
earlier.
38I use standard OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
39In the regressions I only consider the answers with a non-negative difference.
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Table 9: Impatience and time-inconsistency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
impatience impatience time-inconsistency time-inconsistency
CRT -1.476 -0.819 0.715 1.194
(1.347) (1.556) (1.090) (1.251)
NFC -0.102∗ -0.0784 -0.0303 -0.00471
(0.0470) (0.0508) (0.0523) (0.0579)
age -0.0602 -0.0174 -0.184 -0.167
(0.132) (0.168) (0.121) (0.133)
male 6.359 6.834 5.681 7.260∗
(4.192) (4.329) (3.250) (3.453)
math in studies -0.575 -1.227 -1.466 -1.646
(1.238) (1.701) (0.919) (1.182)
econ studies 4.085 0.777
(3.376) (2.372)
education -0.162 0.0340
(2.284) (1.632)
pseudo-AOT -1.362 -0.932
(0.818) (0.570)
Wason task -7.274∗∗
(2.747)
parents’ education YES YES
Constant 24.60∗∗∗ 26.37∗∗∗ 18.55∗∗∗ 20.21∗∗∗
(4.333) (5.881) (4.062) (5.411)
Observations 784 751 664 635
R2 0.008 0.025 0.012 0.029
F 3.129 2.344 1.189 1.607
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions: impatience (i.e. payment forgone
to receive the money earlier) and extent of time-inconsistency (i.e. difference between
preferences, in euros) regressed on CRT, NFC, pseudo-AOT, Wason selection task,
age, gender, extent of mathematics and economics in one’s studies, and the education
level of the participant and her parents.
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gender - males have higher hyperbolia40 - and correctly solving Wason selection task, that
was highly significant with a negative coefficient - having solved the Wason selection task
was associated with a reduction of 7.27 euros in the degree of time-inconsistency.
5.4 Risk neutrality and loss aversion
The risk neutrality of participants was estimated with two questions regarding a hypothetical
lottery ticket with 50 percent chance of winning (losing) 1000 euros. The participants were
asked to indicate how much money they would require (be willing to pay) to sell (discard)
the lottery ticket. Each participant’s degree of risk neutrality was estimated as the difference
between the expected value of such a gamble, and their reply, i.e. how much money they
”left on the table” in expected terms. It should be mentioned here that non-neutral risk
preference is not considered a behavioral bias.
Prospect theory predicts that for the two questions regarding lottery tickets with positive
or negative outcomes, people would be risk averse in the positive domain, yet risk seeking
in the negative domain. In other words, they would be willing to accept a loss in expected
value for each question: to sell the positive lottery ticket below expected value, and to pay
more than the expected loss to discard of the negative one. If one is risk averse in the
positive domain and we assume, as Expected Utility Theory does, a concave utility function
of final wealth, then it is difficult to see how risk seeking behavior in the negative domain
could be consistent with non-behavioral economics.
Out of the 785 participants, 289 (51) were risk averse in the positive (negative) domain,
318 (271) were risk neutral and 177 (462) were risk seeking. 190 were risk neutral in both
domains, while 221 were risk averse in the positive domain, but risk seeking in the negative
domain, i.e. had inconsistent risk preference as predicted by Prospect theory.
The median loss in expected value was 300 euros, the average 361 euros and the standard
deviation 460 euros.
As observable in the regressions41 table 10 ”Risk neutrality and Prospect theory”, CRT
was significant in all the regressions, and linked to both risk neutrality (higher CRT is linked
to decrease in expected loss, i.e. higher risk neutrality) and risk inconsistency, with which
it has a negative coefficient. Each additional point of CRT was associated with an increase
of 34 to 39 euros in expected return.
In regression number one in the table, higher NFC was linked to lower expected loss
(P=0.054), but insignificant (P=0.125) in regression number two. In regressions for the
40P=0.81 and P=0.36 in the two regressions
41Regressions, as regards Expected loss, are standard OLS regressions, while risk inconsistency is estimated
with logistic regressions. All regressions use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
32
Table 10: Risk neutrality and Prospect theory
(1) (2) (3) (4)
expected loss expected loss inconsistency inconsistency
CRT -39.34∗∗ -34.58∗ -0.201∗ -0.192∗
(14.72) (15.54) (0.0812) (0.0854)
NFC -1.768 -1.431 -0.00606 -0.00502
(0.917) (0.931) (0.00422) (0.00437)
age 2.768 3.220 0.0111 0.00535
(2.065) (2.022) (0.00998) (0.0124)
male -156.7∗∗∗ -145.3∗∗∗ -0.0700 -0.0632
(30.39) (29.87) (0.184) (0.195)
math in studies -27.23∗ -24.76∗ -0.0187 -0.00749
(11.04) (11.84) (0.0563) (0.0607)
econ studies -26.77 -0.0244
(22.10) (0.125)
education -12.01 0.0774
(18.92) (0.119)
Wason task -102.4∗∗∗ -0.126
(29.99) (0.273)
parents’ education YES YES
Constant 545.5∗∗∗ 591.4∗∗∗ -0.643 -0.823
(71.44) (101.4) (0.359) (0.507)
Observations 784 751 784 751
R2 0.091 0.100
F 31.59 18.07
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions (1) and (2) are OLS regressions, regressions (3) and (4) logit-
regressions. Expected loss (compared to risk neutral alternative) and inconsistent risk-preferences (dummy
variable) regressed on CRT, NFC and Wason selection task, age and gender, extent of mathematics and
economics in studies, and the level of education of both the participant and her parents.
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sub-group of under 30 year olds, NFC was highly significant in predicting risk neutrality -
see appendix for further discussion.
Additionally, males were more risk neutral, as were those with more mathematical fields
of studies and those who correctly solved the Wason selection task. None of these variables
was significant in predicting risk inconsistency.42
5.5 Religious and political attitudes
In addition to the heuristics-and-biases tasks, the participants were asked to indicate, on a
scale of 1 to 9, i) how religious they considered themselves and ii) their attitudes towards
several moral issues: abortion, the rights of sexual minorities, poverty and responsibility,
global warming. The correlations between the opinions on each issue are presented in table
5.5 .
In many of the topics discussed here, CRT, NFC and pseudo-AOT were all linked to more
liberal attitudes on certain topics: controlling for various factors, high scoring people were
often less religious, more likely to consider climate change as a serious threat, more likely to
support the equality of sexual minorities and more likely to recommend an abortion for an
unwilling parent-to-be. However, the relations were not homogeneous - all of the measures
were associated with liberal views on some topics, but no single measure could predict moral
judgments on all of the issues.
Table 11: Correlations between religious and political beliefs
Religiosity Discr. Conserv. Judgment. CC denial
Discriminatory attitude 0.3993 1.000
Conservative on abortion 0.3868 0.2676 1.000
Judgmental on poverty 0.0432 0.1672 -0.0047 1.000
Climate change denial 0.0861 0.2481 0.0585 0.3309 1.000
pseudo-AOT -0.3251 -0.2444 -0.1839 -0.0638 -0.1070
Note: The table provides the correlations between opinions on religious and political issues, as well pseudo-
AOT score received by the individual. Higher values stand for more conservative views (with the exception
of pseudo-AOT score, for which a low score implies higher rate of dogmatism. Pseudo-AOT is discussed in
section 6). The variables are reported religiosity, reported discriminatory attitudes towards sexual minorities,
reported judgmental attitudes towards the poor, reported extent of climate change denial and one’s pseudo-
AOT score.
42There is an unexpected relation between parental education and inconsistency in risk preferences. While
higher education received by the mother was linked to a lower probability of inconsistency, higher education
received by the father had an opposite coefficient. This oddity is most likely caused by high multicollinearity
between the education received by the two parents.
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Table 12: Religion and attitude towards sexual minorities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Religiosity Religiosity Sexual discr. Sexual discr. Sexual discr.
CRT -0.175∗ -0.0758 -0.0288 -0.0128 0.00382
(0.0756) (0.0724) (0.0430) (0.0419) (0.0396)
NFC -0.00726 -0.000435 -0.00832∗∗ -0.00537∗ -0.00528∗
(0.00402) (0.00411) (0.00259) (0.00268) (0.00252)
age 0.0111 0.0153 0.00332 0.00587 0.00249
(0.0100) (0.0115) (0.00533) (0.00697) (0.00622)
male -0.175 0.0446 0.283∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.289∗∗
(0.163) (0.172) (0.0956) (0.102) (0.0970)
education -0.0338 -0.0548 -0.0475
(0.0940) (0.0636) (0.0588)
Wason task -0.0177 -0.0187 -0.0148
(0.212) (0.120) (0.106)
pseudo-AOT -0.234∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.0570∗∗∗
(0.0298) (0.0199) (0.0171)
math in studies -0.0946 0.0556 0.0764∗
(0.0509) (0.0323) (0.0312)
religiosity 0.221∗∗∗
(0.0366)
parents’ education YES YES YES
Constant 2.843∗∗∗ 3.521∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ 1.948∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗
(0.326) (0.460) (0.182) (0.292) (0.263)
Observations 783 750 784 751 750
R2 0.024 0.121 0.025 0.091 0.219
F 4.983 9.158 4.270 4.167 5.899
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. The table provides results of several OLS regressions, with the dependent
variable being either one’s reported religiosity (columns (1) and (2)) or one’s reported level of discriminatory
attitudes against sexual minorities (columns (3) to (5)). The dependent variables are regressed on CRT,
NFC and pseudo-AOT scores, success in Wason selection task, age and gender, level of education received by
both the participant and her parents, and the extent of mathematics in one’s field of studies. Additionally,
discriminatory attitudes were regressed on one’s reported religiosity (column (5)).
35
In table 12 I present the regression results43 as regards self-reported religiosity and
discriminatory attitudes towards sexual minorities44.
In regression one both CRT and NFC have a negative coefficient (P=0.21 and 0.71,
respectively). In regression two, with more controls, pseudo-AOT score is the only highly
significant determinant of religiosity, with the variable math having a negative coefficient
and a P-value of 0.064.
In regressions three to five, CRT was insignificant, whereas both NFC and pseudo-AOT
score were significant, with a negative link to discriminatory attitudes. More religious
participants, males and those whose fields of study was more mathematical expressed more
discriminatory attitudes.
Climate change denial45 has several significant explanatory variables. As seen in the
regressions table 13 below, CRT, NFC and pseudo-AOT scores all are linked to lower climate
change denial. Male participants and those with more mathematical fields of studies were
on average less alarmed by global warming.
In regressions three to five I present the regression results for attitudes towards abor-
tion46. In regression three, CRT is significant (with a negative coefficient, i.e. decreases
stated anti-abortion attitude). Controlling for pseudo-AOT, pseudo-AOT becomes highly
significant and CRT becomes insignificant. Controlling for religiosity, pseudo-AOT becomes
insignificant, while religiosity is highly significant47. Moreover, older people have more
conservative opinions on abortion.
The participants were asked whether they hold the poor responsible for their poverty, or
43”religiosity”, on a scale of one to nine, is the answer provided to ”How religious do you consider
yourself?”, whereas in the variable ”sexual discrimination” one stands for ”Sexual minorities should have
perfect equality”, and nine stands for ”The freedoms of sexual minorities should be very restricted”. For
religiosity, the median answer was 2.0, the average 2.57 and standard deviation 2.05. For discrimination of
sexual minorities, the median, average and standard deviation were 1.0, 1.51 and 1.18, respectively.
44I use the word ”equality” as it stands in the Constitution of Finland, Chapter two, Section six: ”No
one shall, without an acceptable reason, be treated differently from other persons on the ground of sex [...]
or other reason that concerns his or her person”Ministry of Justice (1999). I hold that any opinion that
deviates from perfect equality is discriminatory in nature.
45”CC denial” is a variable on a scale of one to nine, with one being ”Global warming is a serious threat
and everything should be done to prevent it”, while nine stands for ”Global warming is not real and should
not be considered by politicians”. The median answer was 2, the mean was 1.97 and standard deviation
1.19.
46In the questionnaire, the participants were presented a story with imaginary friend becoming pregnant
unintentionally and asks for advice. The participants are then asked if they would advice the friend to have
an abortion, on a scale of one to nine, with one being ”Absolutely yes, she should have an abortion” and
nine being ”Absolutely no, she should keep the baby”.
47This interchangeability is most likely due to the high correlation between the variables - I deem i
imprecise to claim that CRT plays no role after controlling for, say, pseudo-AOT, as the interplay between
the two variables remains unclear.
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Table 13: Attitudes on global warming and abortion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CC denial CC denial Pro-life Pro-life Pro-life
CRT -0.0887∗ -0.123∗∗ -0.160∗ -0.109 -0.0776
(0.0391) (0.0399) (0.0730) (0.0750) (0.0688)
NFC -0.00897∗∗∗ -0.00813∗∗ -0.00527 -0.00405 -0.00393
(0.00250) (0.00252) (0.00410) (0.00426) (0.00398)
age -0.00956 -0.00545 0.0519∗∗∗ 0.0469∗∗ 0.0414∗∗
(0.00571) (0.00678) (0.0118) (0.0145) (0.0133)
male 0.577∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ -0.181 -0.0969 -0.112
(0.0940) (0.0995) (0.162) (0.172) (0.161)
education -0.0265 0.0372 0.0534
(0.0613) (0.105) (0.0981)
Wason task 0.0538 0.0793 0.0869
(0.146) (0.234) (0.206)
pseudo-AOT -0.0457∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.0312
(0.0149) (0.0283) (0.0269)
math in studies 0.106∗∗∗ -0.0276 0.00802
(0.0292) (0.0520) (0.0486)
religiosity 0.361∗∗∗
(0.0395)
parents’ education YES YES YES
Constant 2.397∗∗∗ 2.246∗∗∗ 2.396∗∗∗ 2.911∗∗∗ 1.619∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.266) (0.372) (0.543) (0.487)
Observations 784 751 784 751 750
R2 0.063 0.096 0.059 0.084 0.199
F 11.55 8.035 9.515 5.452 15.32
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions: climate change denial (”CC denial”,
scale: 1-9) and anti-abortion attitudes (”pro-life”, scale: 1-9) regressed on CRT, NFC
and pseudo-AOT scores, Wason selection task, age and gender, the extent of mathe-
matics in one’s studies, the level of education received by both the participant and her
parents. Additionally, Pro-life regressed on reported religiosity.
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Table 14: Holding the poor responsible for poverty
(1) (2) (3)
conservative on poverty conservative on poverty conservative on poverty
CRT -0.0503 -0.0864 -0.0393
(0.0576) (0.0596) (0.0574)
NFC -0.00807∗ -0.00845∗∗ -0.00530
(0.00313) (0.00320) (0.00310)
age -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗ -0.0260∗∗
(0.00735) (0.00911) (0.00921)
male 0.590∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.299∗
(0.128) (0.139) (0.138)
pseudo-AOT -0.0458∗ -0.0280
(0.0225) (0.0220)
education -0.0268 -0.0162
(0.0855) (0.0818)
math in studies 0.156∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.0403) (0.0398)
climate change denial 0.390∗∗∗
(0.0525)
parents’ education YES YES
Constant 5.140∗∗∗ 4.772∗∗∗ 3.896∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.361) (0.375)
Observations 784 751 751
R2 0.054 0.082 0.153
F 12.04 8.206 13.74
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions: the extent to which one holds the poor responsible for their
poverty (”conservative on poverty”, scale: 1-9) regressed on CRT, NFC and pseudo-AOT scores, age and
gender, the extent of mathematics in one’s studies, the level of education received by both the participant
and her parents. Additionally, Pro-life regressed on reported religiosity.
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whether environmental factors were to blame. The table 14 presents the results from OLS
regressions48. NFC score has a significant, negative coefficient on the dependent variable in
regressions one and two, pseudo-AOT in regression two, while CRT is insignificant. None of
the three cognitive factors remain significant in regression three, in which I’m controlling for
an additional proxy variable, climate change denial. Additionally, age is linked to a decline
in the dependent variable, whereas variables ”male” and ”math in studies” have significant,
positive coefficients.
6 Discussion
6.1 Summary of findings
In analyzing the survey responses, I find that CRT and NFC are negatively correlated
with bias in decision making, positively with consistent preferences and liberal opinions and
attitudes. Moreover, the two-item pseudo-AOT score and having correctly solved the Wason
selection task both are surprisingly robust in predicting choices.
The multivariable regressions show that people with higher CRT scores tend to have
higher NFC scores, higher pseudo-AOT scores and they solve the Wason selection task with
higher probability. Moreover, they are less prone to Conjunction fallacy, more risk neutral
and less likely to have inconsistent risk preferences. Moreover, they are less religious, less
likely to deny the reality of climate change and have more liberal views on abortion. It is
noteworthy that even though CRT is numerical in nature (and therefore inevitably requires
some mathematical attenuation), the related behavioral patterns are not simply measures
of numeracy49. Therefore, CRT cannot be discarded simply as a measure of numerical
aptitude.
Controlling for various factors, participants who scored higher on the NFC scale were, on
average, better educated, scored higher on CRT and pseudo-AOT scales, were more patient
with monetary rewards, less likely to discriminate against sexual minorities, less likely to
deny climate change exists and less harsh in their opinions regarding the poor. There is also
some evidence for higher risk neutrality and less time-inconsistency of preferences among
high-NFC participants. It should be noted that the behavioral phenomena linked to higher
NFC are only moderately overlapping with those linked to CRT scores.
In the regressions, having a higher pseudo-AOT score was associated with more liberal
views on all the issues presented: the trait was associated with less religiosity, less discrim-
48Median answer 4, average 4.15, standard deviation 1.64.
49Risk neutrality and conjunction fallacy have calculable solutions, but abortion or the (non-)existence of
God arguably have not.
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ination against sexual minorities, lower levels of climate change denial, being pro-choice
on abortion issues and being less judgmental of the poor. It seems, however, that the
a-dogmatism measured by pseudo-AOT does not necessarily translate to better results in
heuristics-and-biases tasks - at least not directly.
Correctly solving the Wason selection task seems to be a sign of being less susceptible
to bias in some heuristics-and-biases tasks, but did not predict variance in any of the issues
of religious or political nature. While controlling for various factors, solving the Wason
selection task was related to lower probability of conjunction fallacy, lower rate of time-
inconsistency of preferences and higher risk neutrality.
Having a more mathematical field of study is linked lower conjunction fallacy and higher
risk neutrality. At the same time, those with more mathematical fields of studies seem to
be more conservative on some of the policy issues studied, at least when compared to their
peers from less mathematical fields of studies.
The different measures of cognitive dispositions are distinct yet highly interconnected
and associated with a range of intertwined aspects of decision making, rendering their one-
by-one analysis extremely difficult. It remains clear that the jungle comprising of all the
different measures of cognitive dispositions as well as numerous biases with interwoven causes
and effects is an area requiring a lot of sorting out.
In some heuristics-and-biases tasks, no link was found between performance in the task
and cognitive dispositions. Most notably, none of the cognitive dispositions measured could
predict the size of Anchoring effect, even though anchoring was widely observed among the
participants. CRT or NFC had no predictive power over participants’ time-inconsistency50.
Many coefficients regarding religious and political beliefs are rather small, yet robust
and significant: individuals with high scores on the measures of cognitive dispositions have
a clear tendency to show more liberal views on controversial issues. Given the sample’s
homogeneity in terms of age and education, I suspect the sample might be so single-minded
on many of the issues presented as to almost hide the extent to which cognitive dispositions
are linked to judgments about religious and political issues. This, naturally, is a field that
requires further research.
6.2 Limitations
It should be noted that the methods used in this survey are open for several limitations.
First of all, the setting is a survey, not an experiment, making it impossible to control for all
the variables required to claim causal interpretation in any scientifically credible manner.
The correlations identified between the variables might be of causal nature, but further
50As noted above, success in Wason selection task was associated with a reduction in time-inconsistency.
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research is required to (dis)qualify such claims.
Another factor possibly affecting the interpretation of single coefficients is multicollinear-
ity, i.e. strong correlations between some of the independent variables.51 The independent
variables of highest interest - those measuring cognitive dispositions - had only moderate
correlation coefficients52. Collinearity between the variables generally goes hand in hand
with higher variance, i.e. to broader confidence intervals and thus failure to reject a false
null hypothesis (see, e.g. Mason and Perreault Jr (1991)). Clearly, experimental settings
are required to reliably study the effects of single measures on heuristics and biases.
As shown by Holt & Laury (2002), people sometimes behave differently in experimen-
tal choice situation depending on whether the payoffs they face are hypothetical or real.
The survey used for the present study measured stated preferences with hypothetical out-
comes, possibly resulting in bias. Levitt and List (2007) - citing numerous experiments in
social psychology - shows that behavior in laboratory experiments are affected by reputation
building, privacy and anonymity, selection into the experiment, social preferences and other
factors not completely controlled by the experimenter, challenging the plausibility of any
generalizations into the outside world. Gneezy and List (2006) observed that a framed field
experiment showed similar patterns to a laboratory experiment - until a few hours later,
as the observed effect all but disappeared with time. Moreover, in ”naturally occurring
environments, the choice set often is almost limitless and institutions arise endogenously”,
in stark contrast to most experiments, an issue best tackled with properly randomized field
experiments (Levitt and List, 2007).
The findings relating to the online survey should be regarded with caution as there always
exists the possibility of cooperation by participants, using online search tools to solve the
puzzles or other phenomena that would undermine the findings. Although we explicitly
asked the participants whether they had used external help and disqualified data from all
participants who answered ”yes” (N=34) the possibility of cooperation or other kinds of
”fraud” cannot be excluded.
Another highly relevant critique regarding the online survey is possible selection bias,
as people might choose to not participate in the survey (especially in a foreign language),
and that choice might correlate with their cognitive characteristics or tendency to show
biased behavior. Especially, it could be argued that NFC is an important determinant in
whether one decides to spend 15 minutes solving puzzles. Moreover, the way the survey is
distributed in social media and via mailing lists might yield non-random selection - whether
51This is especially the case with parental education and age and education: education received by the
father was highly correlated with that of the mother (0.49), while age had a 0.53 correlation with education.
52Up to 0.25 between pseudo-AOT and NFC. These correlations are moderate enough to necessitate no
attention. I have provided VIF tables in the appendix.
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the selection is less random than that of an experiment with under-graduate participants
from a single college remains an open question. Still another concern regarding selection is
that of people giving up during the survey and not finishing - this issue could not be tracked
and so its extent is impossible to know.
Lastly, it should be noted that the questionnaire was in English, while the majority of
the participants were Finnish citizens - a country where English language skills are relatively
high, but still far from native level. Perceptual disfluency (such as a difficult typewrite) has
been linked to bias and learning by engaging higher-level processing (see eg. Yue et al.
(2013) and Hernandez and Preston (2013)) - whether a foreign language one has not quite
mastered has similar effects on survey participants remains unknown.
6.3 Concluding remarks
It might be a uncomfortable conclusion that cognitive skills and the degree of rationality
vary predictably between individuals, and even more controversially, that signs of rationality
are more common among advocates of certain political or religious beliefs. I firmly believe
that both science and society will be better off if we keep on pushing the boundaries of
knowledge and keep searching for the sources of better decision making - whether it makes
us feel uncomfortable or not.
So far, we do not know whether a decrease in dogmatism leads to higher appreciation
of deep thought and numeric savviness or vice versa, whether these traits are fixed at birth
or whether they can be taught in school. While these questions - and many others - remain
unanswered, one thing is clear: if a few questions can predict various biases and behavioral
patterns in individuals, an underlying system linking different parts of our thinking exists
out there. With determination and ingenuity, it can be found.
7 Appendices
7.1 Education, endogeneity and experimental settings
This study, as regards education, lacks robustness, for education is clearly endogenous in
the setting. It is common to expect education to change one’s thinking patterns, whereas
behavioral biases and less-than-fully rational behavior, such as hyperbolic discounting, can
be plausibly expected to affect educational outcomes. A person that has a tendency to
purport some behavioral biases, such as the ones covered in this study, can be expected
to show a tendency for other biases as well. Therefore it is completely plausible to expect
a crucial Gauss-Markov assumption (of zero correlation between the error term and all
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independent variables).
Education has been proven to increase earnings in marginally admitted students (Zim-
merman, 2014). In the favorable case of availability of several rounds of experiments, a
similar discontinuity design could be used to study whether those effects are due to signal-
ing, or to education’s effects on cognitive processes.
In Finland, entrance exams have a key role in the admission process. At the margin, the
difference between receiving an admission and not is a matter of a single percentage point,
which can be considered arbitrary. Therefore, the student who just received his spot and
one who just didn’t can be considered identical in terms of pre-existing cognitive processes
and rationality of behavior. Therefore, a classic discontinuity design applies, and the latter
group of people can be used as a control group, while the treatment group consists of the
ones admitted by an arbitrarily small margin. This notion is an important one, and can be
used for an unbiased interpretation of post-treatment outcomes.
7.2 Robustness checks
7.2.1 VIF check for multicollinearity
In the table below I provide VIF tests ran on two regressions: one for OLS, one for Logit.
The results from OLS do not necessitate reconsidering the variables used in this study,
but the logistic regression VIF results are high, including for the measures of cognitive
dispositions. Thus, especially in the case of logistic regressions in this study, there exists a
heightened probability for failure to reject a false null hypotheses. This highlights the need
for randomized experiments to further proceed our understanding of the topic.
7.2.2 Clearing the effect of age
Below I have conducted robustness checks on my findings by re-running the regressions
on participants under 30 years old. The reason to conduct these tests is that the survey
was spread through social media and university email lists, which might lead to stronger
selection bias in the age groups that not as easily reached through these channels.
In table ”NFC, CRT for under 30 year olds” is presented the coefficients of various
background variables on CRT and NFC. Also, the results of the Wason selection task and
pseudo-AOT are included in regressions three and four. The results differ slightly from
the general analysis done earlier - whereas mother’s education is no more significant for
cognitive characteristics, one’s own level of education has a significant, positive coefficient
on one’s NFC score. Age is no more significant. Moreover, the ”pseudo-score” for Actively
Open-minded Thinking is significant in predicting NFC with a positive coefficient, whereas
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Table 15: VIF tests for multicollinearity
Variable OLS Logit
age 1.49 15.51
education 1.42 17.67
mother’s education 1.4 9.73
father’s education 1.34 8.62
math 1.27 6.10
NFC 1.22 2.83
CRT 1.18 2.05
studies in economics 1.17 1.96
pseudo-AOT 1.10 3.67
Wason test 1.05 1.21
Notes: VIF test results for important variables.
the Wason selection task has a positive and significant coefficient in predicting CRT.
In table ”Risk neutrality and Prospect theory for under 30 year olds” we find that NFC
is now very significant, whereas CRT - while still significant - does not stand out as much.
In predicting Prospect theory, both NFC and CRT were significant at 10% confidence level
in regression number three.
In table ”Conjunction fallacy for under 30 year olds” I present findings relating to Con-
junction Fallacy. In the subset (N=632), the major finding holds: CRT and ”math” are
highly significant, as well as whether the participant answered the other conjunction fallacy-
related problem correctly. Moreover, age, NFC and Wason selection task are significant in
one or more regressions: NFC in regression one53, age in regressions two and three54 and
Wason selection task in regressions two and four55. In regressions one to three, gender in
no more a significant predictor.
In table 19 there are significant differences to the regressions with the full sample -
namely, NFC is significant in predicting impatience and time-inconsistency, while CRT is
significant in predicting time-inconsistency - all with a negative coefficient.
In regressions related to Anchoring effect, findings did not differ for under 30 year olds.
53Note, that ”math” was not controlled for in this regression
54P=0.086 and P=0.045, respectively
55P=0.040 and P=0.057, respectively
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Table 16: NFC, CRT for under 30 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRT NFC CRT NFC
NFC 0.00976∗∗∗ 0.00862∗∗∗
(0.00238) (0.00247)
age 0.0127 -0.354 0.0117 -0.549
(0.0189) (0.341) (0.0190) (0.338)
male 0.390∗∗∗ 4.550∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 2.489
(0.0905) (1.543) (0.0928) (1.576)
education -0.0386 3.021∗ -0.0276 3.666∗∗
(0.0700) (1.269) (0.0696) (1.258)
father’s education -0.0271 -0.250 -0.0351 -0.447
(0.0351) (0.666) (0.0348) (0.650)
mother’s education 0.0404 0.953 0.0391 0.893
(0.0436) (0.770) (0.0429) (0.735)
math in studies 0.118∗∗∗ 1.237∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 1.190∗
(0.0291) (0.524) (0.0290) (0.507)
econ studies -0.0825 1.957 -0.0737 2.460∗
(0.0583) (1.010) (0.0577) (0.985)
CRT 3.052∗∗∗ 2.576∗∗∗
(0.742) (0.739)
Wason task 0.346∗∗∗ 3.032
(0.101) (2.193)
pseudo-AOT 0.0168 1.529∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.285)
Constant 1.121∗∗ 7.400 1.062∗ 5.814
(0.426) (7.548) (0.423) (7.342)
Observations 606 606 606 606
R2 0.133 0.121 0.147 0.173
F 12.80 9.946 13.12 13.01
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes only participants under 30 years
of age. OLS regressions, with CRT and NFC scores regressed on each other and
background and control variables. See table 4.
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Table 17: Risk neutrality and Prospect theory for under 30 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
loss in expected value loss in expected value prospect theory prospect theory
CRT -43.07∗∗ -33.24 -0.149 -0.140
(14.81) (17.10) (0.0885) (0.0960)
NFC -3.114∗∗∗ -2.461∗∗∗ -0.00840 -0.00666
(0.705) (0.723) (0.00486) (0.00513)
age -5.068 -8.367 0.0240 0.0170
(4.643) (5.760) (0.0338) (0.0440)
male -157.3∗∗∗ -113.1∗∗∗ -0.0685 0.0219
(30.88) (29.49) (0.199) (0.223)
math in studies -29.25∗ -0.00984
(13.26) (0.0685)
econ studies -27.73 -0.0925
(23.18) (0.143)
education 1.713 0.0820
(21.43) (0.161)
Wason task -108.4∗∗∗ -0.347
(29.28) (0.314)
parents’ education YES YES
Constant 673.3∗∗∗ 862.2∗∗∗ -1.108 -1.241
(124.5) (166.8) (0.856) (1.034)
Observations 632 606 632 606
R2 0.102 0.130
F 28.24 15.28
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 18: Conjunction fallacy for under 30 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fallacy, Linda fallacy, Linda fallacy, Linda fallacy, Russia
CRT -0.350∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ 0.0394
(0.0828) (0.0854) (0.0889) (0.0906)
NFC -0.00908∗ -0.00631 -0.00708 0.00212
(0.00461) (0.00486) (0.00504) (0.00494)
age -0.0355 -0.0664 -0.0803∗ 0.0512
(0.0299) (0.0387) (0.0400) (0.0320)
male -0.277 -0.0166 -0.109 0.485∗
(0.176) (0.198) (0.209) (0.211)
math in studies -0.156∗∗ -0.130∗ 0.00703
(0.0585) (0.0606) (0.0647)
econ studies -0.0406 -0.0639 0.166
(0.125) (0.131) (0.127)
education 0.139 0.151
(0.145) (0.147)
Wason task -0.525∗ -0.426 -0.570
(0.256) (0.265) (0.299)
pseudo-AOT -0.0393 -0.0272 -0.0522
(0.0315) (0.0326) (0.0331)
fallacy, Russia 0.710∗∗∗
(0.197)
fallacy, Linda 0.742∗∗∗
(0.191)
parents’ education YES
Constant 1.982∗∗ 2.814∗∗∗ 3.025∗∗ -2.604∗∗
(0.753) (0.823) (0.932) (0.863)
Observations 632 632 606 632
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes only participants under 30 years
of age. Logit regression, with conjunction fallacy dummy regressed on measures of
cognitive dispositions and background and control variables. See table 8.
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Table 19: Impatience and time-inconsistency for under 30 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
impatience impatience time-inconsistency time-inconsistency
CRT -0.925 0.0735 2.670∗∗ 3.175∗
(1.220) (1.734) (1.014) (1.244)
NFC -0.149∗∗ -0.111 -0.112∗ -0.0979
(0.0500) (0.0568) (0.0502) (0.0603)
age -0.177 -0.379 -0.0764 -0.123
(0.688) (0.500) (0.483) (0.531)
male 7.764∗ 9.787 4.841 7.332∗
(3.695) (5.531) (2.705) (3.596)
math in studies -2.228 -1.368
(1.951) (1.213)
education 0.891 0.239
(2.683) (2.161)
econ studies 4.818 0.395
(3.618) (2.306)
pseudo-AOT -1.318 -0.457
(0.992) (0.627)
Wason task -3.396 -4.496
(3.745) (2.965)
parents’ education YES YES
Constant 25.00 31.86∗ 4.894 8.691
(18.04) (13.40) (12.69) (12.22)
Observations 632 606 632 606
R2 0.010 0.032 0.018 0.030
F 5.799 2.485 3.698 2.137
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes only participants under 30 years of
age. OLS regression, with impatience (columns (1) and (2)) and hyperbolia (columns
(3) and (4)) regressed on measures of cognitive dispositions and background and control
variables. See table 9.
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7.3 Survey questionnaire
The survey questionnaire used in this study is to be found on the pages below in its totality.
Please not that the within-section item order was randomized. Section structure was as
follows: background information (questions one through 8), then in order questions 9, 10,
11, 12, 13. After the anchoring part, the main section comprised of questions 14 through
48. Feedback section (question 49-53) were presented last.
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Survey for Juuso Nisula's Master's thesis
In this Master's thesis I study opinion forming and decision making under uncertainty. Most questions
presented do not have a right-or-wrong answer. If you do not know an answer, please make an
estimate or guess.
Please provide all answers honestly and without assistance or external help - do not ask a friend,
even if a question is difficult! Please do not use google, a calculator or other similar appliances. If
you need to use a vocabulary to understand a question, please indicate that after the survey. This
survey is completely anonymous.
Thank you for your time, I appreciate your help.
*Required
Background information
Background information
What is your gender?
Mark only one oval.
Male
Female
1.
What is the highest degree your mother has obtained?
Mark only one oval.
High school degree (or equivalent)
Bachelor's degree (or equivalent)
Master's degree (or equivalent)
Doctoral degree
My mother has not obtained any of the above
I do not know
2.
What is the highest degree you have obtained? *
Mark only one oval.
High school degree (or equivalent)
Bachelor's degree (or equivalent)
Master's degree (or equivalent)
Doctoral degree
I have not obtained any of the above
3.
How mathematical is (was) your field of studies? *
If your studies vary significantly in terms of the level of mathematics required, please estimate the
average.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not mathematical at
all (e.g. humanities)
Highly mathematical
(mathematics, statistics
etc.)
4.
What is the highest degree your father has obtained?
Mark only one oval.
High school degree (or equivalent)
Bachelor's degree (or equivalent)
Master's degree (or equivalent)
Doctoral degree
My father has not obtained any of the above
I do not know
5.
What is your age? *6.
What is your nationality?7.
Do you work in economics or finance, or have you studied the said subjects on a
university level?
Please choose all that apply.
Tick all that apply.
I have studied some economics or finance on a university level
I have studied economics and/or finance extensively on a university level
I have some working experience in economics or finance
I have significant working experience in economics and/or finance
I do not work in economics or finance, and have not studied either on a university level
8.
Which day of the month were you born on? *
Please provide a numerical answer: if you were
born on x'th of March in 1987, you would answer
x
9.
Suppose your favorite movie is getting a sequel, and you could buy a ticket to the world
premiere. Now, consider the day of the month you were born on: would you be willing to
pay more euros than that to buy the ticket? *
In other words, if you were born on the x'th day, then would you pay more than x euros for the
ticket to the world premiere of the sequel to your favorite movie?
Mark only one oval.
Yes, I would pay more than that
No, I would not pay that much
10.
How much would you be willing to pay for a
ticket to the world premiere of the sequel to
your favorite movie? *
Please provide a numerical answer (in euros).
11.
Again, consider the day of the month you were born on, and use that number (in
percentage points) as a reference point. In your opinion, will China's economy grow slower
or faster than that in 2016? *
If you were born on the x'th day, then, in your opinion, will China's economy (GDP) grow over or
under x% in 2016, compared to 2015? Please consider the change in absolute size (growth of the
economy), not change in growth rate. Remember, that it is quite normal to not know the precise
answer - please use your best estimate.
Mark only one oval.
China's economy will grow faster than that
China's economy will not grow that fast
12.
In your opinion, by how many percentage
points will China's economy grow in 2016? *
Please provide your answer in a number form.
For clarity, write x for growth of x% (or -x for
growth of -x%, indicating a decline of x%).
13.
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
14.
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
15.
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in
depth about something. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
16.
I would prefer complex to simple problems. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
17.
Suppose that you will receive 100€ in one
year for certain. If you accepted a smaller
amount, you could receive the money today
instead of in one year. What is the smallest
amount to have today that you would prefer
over the 100€ in one year? *
Please provide a numerical answer in euros
18.
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
19.
I find satisfaction in thinking hard and for long hours. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
20.
Suppose your friend, a young woman, gets pregnant unintentionally, and neither she or her
partner would want to keep the baby. It is now the third week of pregnancy, and they are
considering an abortion. She asks for your opinion; would you recommend her to have an
abortion, or to keep the baby? *
Choose a number between the two extremes that best describes your opinion.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Absolutely
yes, she
should
have an
abortion.
Absolutely
not, she
should
keep the
baby.
21.
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
22.
Suppose you have a lottery ticket that has a
50% chance of winning 1000€ (and otherwise
has a value of zero). What is the smallest
amount you would sell it for? *
In other words, you have a 50% chance of
winning 1000€. Please provide a numerical
answer.
23.
What is your take on global warming? *
Choose a number between the two extremes that best describes your opinion.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Global
warming is
a serious
threat, and
everything
should be
done to
prevent it.
Global
warming is
not real,
and should
not be
considered
by
politicians.
24.
It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
25.
Suppose you have a "negative lottery ticket"
that has a 50% chance of losing 1000€ (and
otherwise has a value of zero). What is the
largest amount you would be willing to pay to
get rid of it? *
In other words, you have a 50% chance of losing
1000€. How much would you be willing to pay to
eliminate that risk? Please provide a numerical
answer (in euros). Assume that there is no other
possibility to get rid of the negative lottery ticket
than to pay.
26.
How religious do you consider yourself to be?
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not religious
at all
Very
religious
27.
The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
28.
I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
29.
A bat and a ball cost 1.1€ in total, the bat
costs 1€ more than the ball. How many cents
does the ball cost? *
Please provide a numerical answer
30.
"Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be made
against them." Do you agree? *
Choose a high number if you agree with the statement, and a low number if you disagree
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
31.
Suppose that you will receive 100€ in two
years for certain. If you accepted a smaller
amount, you could receive the money in one
year instead of two years. What is the
smallest amount to have in one year that you
would prefer over the 100€ in two years? *
Please provide a numerical answer in euros
32.
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which alternative do you consider more
likely? *
Mark only one oval.
Linda is a bank teller
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement
33.
What is your take on the freedoms of sexual minorities?
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Sexual
minorities
should
have
perfect
equality
The
freedoms of
sexual
minorities
should be
very
restricted
34.
I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
35.
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
36.
I usually end up thinking in depth about issues even when they do not affect me
personally. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
37.
Suppose there are four cards, all of which have a number on one side, and a letter on the
other side. You only see one side of each card. The cards have the following symbols on
them: G, 7, 2, U. Which card(s) you would have to turn around to evaluate whether the
following statement is true: "if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number
on the other side". *
Only turn around the card(s) that you would have to in order to make a judgement about whether
the statement is true or false.
Tick all that apply.
G
7
2
U
38.
"People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs."
Do you agree? *
Choose a high number if you agree with the statement, and a low number if you disagree
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
39.
The Russian economy has been in turmoil for a while, and Finnish exports to Russia have
declined. Which alternative do you consider more likely to happen in 2016? *
Please only consider the two alternatives given here.
Mark only one oval.
The Russian economy will recover, causing the stock prices of Finnish exporting
companies to rise
The Russian economy will recover, whether or not it affects stock prices in Finland
40.
It takes five machines five minutes to finish
five products. How many minutes does it
take 100 machines to finish 100 products? *
Please provide a numerical answer
41.
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
42.
I only think as hard as I have to. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
43.
If somebody is very poor in a Western society (e.g. Finland), is it his/her own fault? *
Choose a number between the two extremes that best describes your opinion.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
It is
never
his own
fault, at
all
It is always
and
completely his
own fault
44.
I feel relief, rather than satisfaction, after completing a task that required a lot of mental
effort. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
45.
Thinking is not my idea of fun. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
46.
Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. *
Choose a high number if the statement is very characteristic of you, and a low number if it is not.
Mark only one oval.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I disagree
very
strongly
I agree
very
strongly
47.
Powered by
Imagine a pond in which there is a patch of
water-lilies that doubles in size (area) every
day. It takes the patch 48 days before it
covers the whole pond. How many days does
it take for the patch to cover half the pond? *
Please provide a numerical answer
48.
If you want to be notified about the results
once the thesis is finished, please leave your
email address here
49.
Have you ever studied behavioral economics
or psychology of decision making, or read
literature related to the subject?
50.
Now that you have taken the survey, would you like to comment on it?51.
Had you encountered the puzzles in this
survey before? Please specify.
52.
Did you use external help, such as a pocket
calculator or Google to answer the
questions, or did you cooperate with a
friend? *
53.
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